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TORTS
William E. Crawford*
In Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast,' the Louisiana Supreme Court, after
more than a decade, spoke to the question of how the plaintiff's fault
affects his cause of action in products liability. During that decade, the
courts of appeal have frequently attempted to deal with the problem.2
The weight of those opinions was to view contributory negligence as
applicable to a claim in products liability. There was good ground to
argue that the Weber opinion itself provided for contributory negligence
when it used the phrase, "who, without fault on his part." 3 The United
States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, had expressly held that
contributory negligence was not applicable to products liability claims
under Louisiana law,4 settling the question in the federal system. Sub-
sequently, the advent of the comparative negligence legislation in 1980
sharpened the issue, because the rule of contributory negligence histor-
ically was not favored by the courts when its effect was to completely
bar the plaintiff's claim. Comparative negligence allows contributory
negligence to diminish rather than defeat recovery and does not have
as harsh an impact on the plaintiff's action as the rule of contributory
negligence, so that there is no longer so great a reluctance to recognize
a plaintiff-detrimental rule.
The Bell court wrote its opinion in response to a question certified to the
court by the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 6 as follows: "Does
the Louisiana Civil Code permit the defense known as contributory negli-
gence to be advanced to defeat or mitigate a claim of strict liability based upon
a defective product, the theory of liability commonly known as 'product li-
ability?' "
The Louisiana Supreme Court characterized the plaintiff's circum-
stances as follows:
The plaintiff was injured while performing a repetitive operation
with a defective industrial machine as required by his employer.
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1. 462 So. 2d 166 (La. 1985).
2. See cases cited id. at 169.
3. Weber v. Fidelity & Casualty Ins. Co., 259 La. 599, 602, 250 So. 2d 754, 755
(1971).
4. Khoder v. AMF. Inc., 539 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1976).
5. 1979 La. Acts No. 431 (effective August 1, 1980).
6. 717 F.2d 181, 183 (5th Cir. 1983).
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His hand got caught in the chain and sprocket drive of the
conveyor system of the machine because of the lack of an
adequate guard at the particular place on the drive that the
injury occurred. His ordinary contributory negligence in com-
bination with the machine's defect caused the accident. 7
Expressing its philosophical concern, the court then stated that con-
tributory negligence does not apply as a complete bar to recovery in
products liability cases, because such a rule would defeat the primary
objective of the entire body of products liability law as developed by
the courts. The court said, however, that pure comparative fault prin-
ciples would meet those objectives, though comparative negligence should
not be applied in the case before the court because diminishing plaintiff's
recovery would not serve to improve the performance of workers sim-
ilarily situated and the reduction of damages owed by the manufacturer
would not serve the goal of deterring further manufacture of defective
products. This is the heart of the opinion.
The court established comparative negligence for products liability
by finding that Civil Code article 2323 had always provided for a doctrine
of comparative negligence, which the courts had allowed to "fall into
oblivion." The principles of comparative negligence found in article
2323, as amended, are to be applied by analogy to products liability
claims (presumably because article 2323, as amended, applies only "[w]hen
contributory negligence is applicable, ' 8 and the court here finds that
contributory negligence as a bar has not been applicable to products
claims).
The recognition of the applicability of comparative negligence in
this fashion is a declaration that the law has always been to this effect.
The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal recognized this in May-
belline,9 using the phrase "it has always been the law." Thus, com-
parative negligence in products matters refers at this instance to all
pending products claims, even if the injuries occurred prior to the date
of the opinion. The statutory comparative negligence scheme, on the
other hand, was effective only to those claims arising subsequent to the
effective date of the legislative act. The effect of recognizing legal
doctrines or theories by the court, as contrasted to their establishment
by the legislature, is the express subject of Ardoin v. Hartford Accident
& Indem. Co.' 0
There is an even more interesting possibility in this vein. If Civil
Code article 2323 is indeed the foundation in our civil law heritage of
7. 462 So. 2d at 172.
8. La. Civ. Code art. 2323.
9. Walker v. Maybelline Co., No. 84-CA-0225 (La. App. 1st Cir. Oct. 8, 1985).
10. 360 So. 2d 1331, 1338 (La. 1978).
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the doctrine of comparative negligence, and if, as in Maybelline, it has
always been our law, then would not comparative negligence apply to
all claims, whether products or not, and particularly, would the doctrine
not apply to those claims arising prior to 1980 (the effective date of
statutory comparative negligence), but still pending in the court? Log-
ically, this result would follow.
The Bell opinion accomplishes another much needed improvement
in the products liability jurisprudence of this state, in declaring that
assumption of risk as to products liability claims would also be subject
to the rule of comparative fault. Often the distinction between as-
sumption of risk and contributory negligence is one without a difference.
It would be abhorrent to allow the affirmative defenses of contributory
negligence and assumption of risk to have different effects, with the
one promising only at most a diminution of the plaintiff's claim, and
the latter carrying with it an absolute defeat of the action. Any modern
scheme of products liability law shaped to achieve its inherent objectives
requires that comparative negligence apply to both defenses.
This opinion may also settle the issue of whether assumption of
risk in ordinary negligence claims is subject to the comparative fault
doctrine of article 2323. Note the precise words of the opinion itself:
Thus, the net effect of article 2323, as amended, is to prevent
the courts from applying any defense more injurious to a damage
claim than comparative negligence. The article does not, how-
ever, state when the courts shall permit a defense of contributory
or comparative negligence to affect a plaintiff's recovery, nor
does it prohibit the courts from applying comparative negligence
to a claim previously insusceptible to the bar of contributory
negligence."
This writer interprets the court's statement to mean that assumption
of risk in ordinary negligence claims is subject to the rule of comparative
fault. The quoted statement further bolsters the established application
of comparative fault to the defense of victim fault in strict liability
claims under articles 2317 through 2322, when victim fault is comprised
of ordinary contributory negligence. Logically the statement is broad
enough to require that victim fault comprising assumption of risk
also be subjected to the comparative doctrine.
The remaining Loescher v Parr"2 defenses, third-party fault and force
majeure, are not defenses in the sense of contributory negligence and
assumption of risk, for if they are established by a defendant, they
carry a finding of non-liability, since under the rule of Olsen v. Shell
i. 462 so. 2d at 170 (emphasis added).
12. 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975).
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Oil Co.," there would have been no wrongdoing whatsoever on the part
of the defendant. It would follow that third-party fault and force majeure
do not diminish a plaintiff's claim but rather show that the defendant
is not liable at all, usually for lack of causation.
The Bell court went further still and subjected the defense of "mis-
use" to comparative negligence, or, perhaps more accurately, merged
the defense into comparative negligence. It is important to distinguish
misuse in the sense probably intended by the opinion, which ought to
be equated with contributory negligence, from a misuse which in reality
is an "abnormal use." When the plaintiff fails to establish that his
injury occurred as a result of "normal use" of the product (often
because the defense, in its case, shows that the use was an abnormal
one), the prima facia case under Weber has not been established. If
the use was abnormal, then there was no defect and hence no liability.
It is not that the damages should be diminished, but that there should
no award because the defendant breached no duty to the plaintiff, in
that there was no defect that was the cause of plaintiff's injury. It
would be important to the defense, if the misuse in question is in fact
abnormal use, to have jury instructions to this effect because the question
of normal or abnormal use is for the jury.
The term "misuse" originated in the common law states where
products liability was implemented through strict liability, which his-
torically had not been subject to the defense of contributory negligence.
This problem is best illustrated in the New York case of Codling v.
Paglia, 4 in which the court announced that "misuse in the manner"
would be a defense in products liability claims and quite candidly noted
that there was no difference between that term and "contributory neg-
ligence."
Lastly, is it for the court or for the jury to decide the question of
whether the work or occupation of the plaintiff at the time of injury
should be characterized as "repetitive" and hence not subject to com-
parative negligence. It is submitted that in theory the question is one
of duty, i.e., did the plaintiff, under the circumstances, owe himself a
duty of care to protect against the risk of injury from this defective
machine? Questions of duty are for the court, not for the jury, because
they are in truth questions of law, not of fact. There are pragmatic
benefits to be achieved by allocating this question to the court, rather
than to the jury. It is easy to envision two factory workers each doing
the same job, each being injured by the same machine, and each trying
their claims before separate juries. Depending on all the vagaries of
litigation, i.e., the particular qualifications of the jury, of the various
13. 365 So. 2d 1285 (La. 1978).
14. 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (N.Y. 1973).
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attorneys, and of the court, the claim of one plaintiff could be subjected
to comparative negligence on a finding of repetitive character, while the
other jury could find to the contrary and apply comparative negligence,
thus leading to very undesirable inconsistencies.
A more difficult issue procedurally will be encountered when an
astute plaintiff's attorney attempts to have the affirmative defense of
comparative negligence stricken from the answer because of the alleged
non-repetitive character of the work, and thus attempts to establish in
advance of trial that the affirmative defense is not viable. His purpose
in doing this will be to keep from the jury's ears all of the testimony
as to the supposed wrongdoing of the plaintiff, which is bound to have
effect on the jury if they hear it during trial, even if the judge rules
that the affirmative defense is not viable. The defendant will with good
reason suggest that the question of repetitive character should be resolved
by the court only after hearing the evidence as a whole and that it is
pointless to extract one major issue of the trial and hear it twice. The
wiser course may well be to allow the jury to hear all the evidence and
the law as charged by the judge, and then to follow its conscience in
arriving at a just verdict. The procedural grounds for hearing the question
preliminarily, however, are also well-established, as would have been the
case under Baumgartner v. United States" in which a motion to strike
the affirmative defense of contributory negligence would certainly have
been allowed. As the case-by-case jurisprudence grows, the question may
well resolve itself, since the non-applicability will be apparent by mere
identification of the occupation which the plaintiff was engaged in at
the time of injury.
15. 322 U.S. 665, 64 S. Ct. 1240 (1944).
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